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THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S PERRY DECISION 
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
William N. Eskridge Jr.* 
In Perry v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit ruled that California’s Proposition 8 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.1 Reacting to the state supreme court’s 
recognition of marriage equality for lesbian and gay couples, Proposition 8 was 
a 2008 voter initiative that altered the state constitution to “restore” the “tradi-
tional” understanding of civil marriage to exclude same-sex couples. The major 
theme of the Yes-on-Eight campaign was that the state should not deem lesbian 
and gay unions to be “marriages” because schoolchildren would then think that 
lesbian and gay relationships are just as good as straight “marriages.” 
Is taking away a minority group’s status as marriage-worthy constitution-
ally problematic? Judge Stephen Reinhardt’s opinion for the Ninth Circuit 
panel found it so, and the court demanded that the initiative’s proponents dem-
onstrate a public interest (apart from moral condemnation) justifying this dis-
criminatory demotion in status. The proponents’ primary justification was that 
discrimination against lesbian and gay couples helps the state encourage “re-
sponsible [i.e., marital] procreation” by straight couples. Judge Reinhardt could 
not understand how taking away marriage from lesbian and gay couples can 
reasonably be understood to encourage straight couples to procreate within a 
marital union. 
In the blogosphere, Judge Reinhardt’s Perry opinion has come under heav-
ier fire from commentators favoring marriage equality than from those opposed 
to equality. Some gay-friendly commentators have lamented that the Ninth Cir-
cuit did not announce a general right of lesbian and gay couples to marry all 
over the country and have criticized the court’s narrow reasoning as “dishon-
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 1.  Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *28 (9th Cir. 
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est,”2 analytically “wobbly,”3 and “disingenuous.”4 In my view, the court got it 
right, as a matter of law and as a matter of constitutional politics.  
Start with the role of federal courts of appeals in our rule of law system: 
their role is a limited one, a point these pro-gay commentators have neglected. 
Such courts (1) are supposed to address the particular factual context presented 
by the parties, (2) must follow the binding precedent of their own circuit and of 
the Supreme Court, and (3) ought usually to choose narrow rather than broad 
grounds for decision. Judge Reinhardt’s Perry opinion is exemplary along all 
three dimensions. 
Proposition 8 intended that gay and lesbian couples be carved out of civil 
marriage and relegated to a separate institution, domestic partnerships. The 
court properly viewed this official status segregation with suspicion—a suspi-
cion that was confirmed by the proponents’ open denigration of lesbian and gay 
marriages and their inability to tie taking away marriage rights to a genuine 
public interest. The original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause was that 
the Constitution does not tolerate class legislation—namely, laws that separate 
one class of citizens from the rest and bestow upon its members a less esteemed 
legal regime and, with it, an inferior status.5 This is exactly what Proposition 8 
did. Hence, Judge Reinhardt was strictly enforcing the original meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause, as applied to the facts before him.  
Should Judge Reinhardt have gone further, to rule that lesbian and gay 
couples in all states enjoy a “fundamental” right to marry, resulting in strict 
scrutiny that would be fatal to the exclusion of such couples in the laws of the 
more than forty states now denying marriage equality? For two decades, I have 
maintained that the Constitution does assure lesbian and gay couples such a 
fundamental right.6 But I am not a court of intermediate appeal. As such a 
 
 2.  Jason Mazzone, Marriage and the Ninth Circuit: Thumbs Down, BALKINIZATION 
(Feb. 7, 2012, 7:18 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/02/marriage-and-ninth-circuit-
thumbs-down.html.  
 3.  Editorial, Wobbly Justice, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2012, at A16, available at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/proposition-8-decision-was-just-but-wobbly/2012/02/ 
08/gIQApOh1zQ_story.html. 
 4.  David Cole, Gambling with Gay Marriage, NYRBLOG (Feb. 9, 2012, 11:48 AM), 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/feb/09/gambling-gay-marriage/. 
 5. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE 
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 176-78 (1988); Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legis-
lation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 271-93 (1997). In the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, the Supreme Court applied the Equal Protection Clause only when the state was dis-
criminating based on a suspect classification, such as race or sex, or when the state was 
denying one group “fundamental” rights, such as the right to vote or travel. In the last gen-
eration, however, the Court has followed a more contextual approach, where the constitu-
tional fate of state discriminations has turned on a functional balance involving the suspect-
ness of the classification, the importance of the rights denied, and the quality of the state’s 
interest. 
 6. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL 
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 123-24 (1996). 
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court, the Ninth Circuit panel was right, as a matter of standard legal practice, 
not to engage this broader argument.  
First, Judge Reinhardt’s opinion focused on the particular deprivation im-
posed by Proposition 8, which was distinctive in several respects: it took away 
a right that state law had deemed “fundamental,” and it did so in the context of 
an initiative campaign that was exclusively focused on denying lesbian and gay 
persons the special status associated with marriage in our society. The typical 
role of a court is to figure out how legal authority should be applied to particu-
lar facts. Unlike a legislature, which usually speaks in broader, generally appli-
cable rules, a court applies general rules to particular facts. 
Second, courts are supposed to prefer narrow rather than broad grounds for 
their rulings. Indeed, this is the genius of the common law. Rather than making 
broad pronouncements, courts in our legal system typically make narrow pro-
nouncements grounded in the facts. At some point, a broad principle may 
emerge for an issue that recurs. The common law pragmatically believes that 
general principles come slowly and incrementally, through a series of modest 
rulings, fortified by social and political feedback, and then expanded if society 
moves toward the larger precept. Constitutional law operates in the same com-
mon law manner, and the issue of marriage equality is one on which the coun-
try as a whole is not at rest.7  
Third, precedent supports the narrower reasoning of Judge Reinhardt as 
opposed to the more sweeping reasoning advocated by some commentators. 
The Supreme Court has said very little about how the Equal Protection Clause 
applies to gay people. In Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down a Colorado 
initiative that took away some antidiscrimination rights enjoyed by gay per-
sons.8 The Court emphasized that the initiative took away from a disadvantaged 
minority guarantees of equal treatment that most Americans take for granted, 
and it did so without a clear justification based on the public interest. Proposi-
tion 8 did the same thing, and Judge Reinhardt was right to follow binding Su-
preme Court precedent. 
To be sure, Romer was different from Perry in one respect: the Colorado 
initiative took away a variety of specific legal rights and benefits, while the 
California initiative took away a unique status (i.e., marriage). These are differ-
ent kinds of deprivations, but they are qualitatively similar in their affront to the 
Equal Protection Clause. Consider a history-based thought experiment. 
 
 7. Judging from the largely acquiescent reaction to Perry, California is largely at rest 
on the matter of marriage equality, as is New York, whose legislature legalized lesbian and 
gay marriages in 2011 after a period of judicial, executive, and legislative experimentation—
what I call “equality practice.” See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL 
UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS (2002). 
 8. 517 U.S. 620, 623-24, 635-36 (1996). 
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In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court invalidated state bars to interra-
cial marriages.9 Assume that the opponents of marriage equality in one state 
responded with a law taking away from interracial spouses a dozen legal rights 
linked with civil marriage. And assume that opponents in another state re-
sponded with a law taking away from interracial spouses the status of being 
married but gave them all the legal benefits and rights under a separate institu-
tion, call it “domestic partnership.” Adhering to Loving, lower federal courts 
would have to strike down both laws, and for basically the same reason: both 
laws would violate the equality mandate by creating a subordinate class of citi-
zens. In some respects, the latter law (like Proposition 8) is a more open status 
denigration, but both laws would be constitutionally problematic. 
Thus, Judge Reinhardt was required by Romer to strike down California’s 
Proposition 8. There is no Supreme Court precedent that is as close to this case 
as Romer. If he had ruled that lesbian and gay couples have a fundamental right 
to marry or that sexual orientation classifications are inherently suspect, Judge 
Reinhardt could have reasoned from Supreme Court precedent, but there would 
have been no precedent as much on point as Romer.10 
As a matter of constitutional law, Judge Reinhardt’s opinion was more rig-
orously reasoned than either the trial court’s opinion that he affirmed or the 
views of commentators who would have liked a more sweeping ruling. The 
fans of a broader ruling, of course, are more inspired by constitutional politics 
than by constitutional law—but they are wrong about the politics as well. 
As the proverbial “least dangerous branch,” the federal judiciary (headed 
by the Supreme Court) is unable, and usually unwilling, to strongly challenge 
entrenched inequalities in this country. Judges may be willing to nudge the 
country in the right direction, but rarely do they give a hard shove until the bal-
ance of antiminority prejudice and prominority sympathy has shifted toward the 
latter. 
Recall the interracial marriage bars. The Supreme Court could have invali-
dated them right after Brown v. Board of Education.11 The Court decided not to 
do so,12 reluctantly but wisely. The justices understood that democracy itself is 
threatened if forced to prematurely decide an issue that intensely but evenly di-
 
 9. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). There are many parallels between marriage equality litigation 
for interracial couples more than a generation ago and similar litigation for same-sex couples 
today. Both campaigns sought state recognition for committed couples whose relationships 
had traditionally not been recognized by the state. In both instances, moral attitudes as well 
as social prejudice inspired popular opposition. 
 10. For example, Loving recognized a constitutional right to marry, but in the context 
of an interracial heterosexual couple who wanted to have children. Romer is a tighter fit with 
Perry than Loving. 
 11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 12. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956), dismissing appeal from 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956) 
(refusing to reach the merits of an equal protection challenge to Virginia’s antimiscegenation 
law, whose grounding in a theory of “white supremacy” was analytically contrary to Brown). 
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vides the polity.13 In 1955, three-fifths of the states barred interracial mar-
riages, and feelings ran high on the issue. By 1967, only a third discriminated 
in this way, and many opponents felt less strongly.14 Only then did the Court 
insist on marriage equality for interracial couples. Southerners bitterly criti-
cized the Court, but the racist cause of open apartheid was lost by 1967. 
The crusade against marriage equality for gays is still robust in the United 
States today. Only seven states (perhaps eight soon, pending the passage of leg-
islation in Maryland) and the District of Columbia now recognize same-sex 
marriage. More than forty states specifically forbid it, most as a matter of state 
constitutional law. Americans are evenly divided on the issue, and partisans on 
both sides have heated feelings. Under these circumstances, the federal judicial 
branch ought not to issue broad rulings that pretend to decide the issue once 
and for all. This was a lesson of Roe v. Wade, a prematurely sweeping decision. 
For this reason, the Supreme Court would be wise to deny review for the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision or to go along with Judge Reinhardt’s narrow ruling. 
California is ready for marriage equality in ways most of the rest of the country 
is not: there are thousands of openly lesbian and gay couples, many rearing 
children, who have persuaded their neighbors and coworkers that marriage 
equality would be good for their communities. Opposition remains, but its in-
tensity has diminished.  
Other states are not ready, because there are fewer openly lesbian or gay 
families and because opposition is more widespread and more intense. It is 
likely that the federal courts of appeals in the South would be reluctant to reach 
exactly the same result as the Ninth Circuit in Perry. For now, the Supreme 
Court should deny review of those decisions as well. This would allow individ-
ual states to deliberate further, consistent with the common law tradition and 
with the Court’s view of the states as “laboratories of experimentation.” 
Marriage equality is an idea whose time has come for California, as well as 
for New York, whose legislature recognized marriage equality last year.15 But 
has its time come everywhere in the country? I fear not. The nation’s constitu-
tional culture is much more accepting of lesbian and gay couples today than at 
the turn of the millennium, but much of the country is still hostile to gay people 
generally and marriage equality in particular. 
Does that mean the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court should cower be-
hind a constitutional heckler’s veto? Of course not. But when the hecklers are 
the bulk of the audience, the constitutional speaker needs to tread more care-
 
 13. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 93-99 (1956) (suggesting 
that stable “polyarchy” must avoid political divisions that are both intense and evenly 
matched). 
 14.  On the decline of antimiscegenation laws after Brown, see RANDALL KENNEDY, 
INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 244-80 (2003). 
 15.  As did the California legislature in 2005 and 2007. In both instances, Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger, the same governor who refused to defend Proposition 8 in Perry, 
vetoed the bills. 
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fully. Courts can help put an issue on the public law agenda, and they can 
channel discourse into productive directions. They can also help create condi-
tions for falsification of stereotypes and prejudice-driven arguments, such as 
the canard that gay marriage will undermine “traditional” marriage. But courts 
cannot create a national consensus on an issue about which “We the People” 
are not at rest. And nationally, the people are not at rest. 
In the United States, as a whole, marriage equality is an idea whose time is 
coming. And Judge Reinhardt’s decision in Perry v. Brown advances the ball 
just a little, and not too much. 
